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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Andrew Barry contends the district court abused its discretion in two respects relating to
his motion for leniency filed pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b) (hereinafter, Rule 35).  First, he asserts the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance, which was based on
the  fact  that,  at  the  time  of  the  hearing  on  his  motion,  he  was  still  awaiting  the  results  of  his
screening for mental health court, and he intended to present that program as a new sentencing
alternative for the district court to consider.  Second, he contends the district court abused its
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion at that hearing.  As a result of these errors, this Court
should vacate the order denying Mr. Barry’s motion and remand this case to the district court for
further proceedings.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Barry pled guilty to one count of burglary for, while in
the midst of a divorce, forcing his way into his neighbor’s house to try to retrieve his dog, which
his wife had given to the neighbors during the divorce.  (R., pp.54-55.)  In exchange, the State
agreed to dismiss other charges and to recommend a withheld judgment and no additional jail
time.1  (R., pp.45, 54-57.)  At 48 years old, the instant offense represented Mr. Barry’s first
felony, and second lifetime, conviction.  (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),
pp.1, 4-5 (noting Mr. Barry’s only other conviction was thirty years old).)
During the presentence process, a psychological evaluation was conducted on Mr. Barry.
(PSI, pp.42-51.)  That evaluation was unable to conclude whether Mr. Barry had substance abuse
1 The State was ultimately relieved of its obligation to make that recommendation when
Mr. Barry failed to appear for the sentencing hearing.  (See R., pp.45, 69.)
2
issues,2 but it did diagnose him with narcissistic personality disorder and an unspecified bipolar
disorder with hypomanic episodes.  (PSI, p.48.)  Although defense counsel continued to
recommend the district court suspend Mr. Barry’s sentence, the district court concluded
Mr.  Barry  was  unlikely  to  be  successful  on  probation  due  to  the  effects  of  his  personality
disorder and substance abuse issues.  (R., pp.74-75.)  Therefore, it imposed and executed a
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed.  (R., p.75.)
One hundred nineteen days after the judgment of conviction was entered, and with the
assistance of a new attorney, Mr. Barry filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency.  (R., pp.78,
84-85.)  In support of that motion, Mr. Barry presented an application he had made, and which
had been granted, for housing in the minimum security custody unit (MCU).  (Aug. p.3.)3  He
also provided a copy of his custody classification level, which showed him to be a low-risk
inmate with no disciplinary or corrective actions while in custody (a prerequisite to be eligible
for MCU housing).  (Aug., p.4.)
The district court scheduled a hearing on Mr. Barry’s motion.  (R., pp.86-89.)  At that
hearing, defense counsel informed the district court that he had been trying to contact personnel
from the mental health court program so as to have Mr. Barry screened for that program in light
of his qualifying diagnosis, but had not yet been able to talk with them.  (R., p.90.)  As a result,
the district court granted Mr. Barry’s motion to continue that hearing.  (R., p.90.)
At the subsequent hearing, defense counsel represented that, while the screening process
had begun, but the mental health court personnel had not been able to fully review Mr. Barry’s
2 There are indications that Mr. Barry has a significant history of drug use, but none of the
presentence evaluations provided to the district court contain conclusions as to whether there is a
diagnosable condition in that regard.  (See generally PSI, pp.28-36.)
3 A  motion  to  augment  the  record  with  Mr.  Barry’s  with  the  documents  Mr.  Barry  filed  in
support of his Rule 35 motion has been filed contemporaneously with this brief.
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application.  (Tr., p.3, Ls.21-23.)  As a result, defense counsel requested another continuance so
as to get the results from the mental health court screening.  (Tr., p.4, Ls.10-13; see also
Tr., p.14, Ls.8-11.)  He explained, “I don’t think we need extensive time” for the mental health
court  staff  to  complete  the  screening.   (Tr.,  p.4,  Ls.3-4.)   However,  trial  counsel  also
acknowledged that the victims had appeared at both hearings, and so, was also ready to proceed
with the hearing should the district court deny that motion, and represented his client also desired
to move forward with the hearing.  (Tr., p.3, L.24 - p.4, L.13.)  The prosecutor objected to, and
the district court ultimately denied, that request for a continuance.  (Tr., p.4, Ls.16-23, p.5, L.6 -
p.6, L.2.)
When the district court subsequently attempted to get Mr. Barry on the telephone to give
testimony, the prison staff informed the district court he was not available at that time.  (Tr., p.6,
L.22 - p.7, L.8.)  At that time, defense counsel renewed the request for a continuance.  (Tr., p.7,
Ls.9-20.)  Again, the district court denied that motion, but it allowed defense counsel to make an
offer of proof as to what Mr. Barry’s testimony would have been.  (Tr., p.7, Ls.21-25.)
Defense counsel took that alternative option and represented that Mr. Barry would have
testified to having developed a different outlook about the case than he had shown during the
presentence process, and had been working to accept responsibility for his actions.  (Tr., p.17,
Ls.18-23.)  Mr. Barry would also testify he had sold his house, so there would no longer be a
concern about Mr. Barry living close to the victims, which potentially would have violated the
no-contact order which had been issued in the case.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.14-19.)  Additionally,
Mr. Barry would testify to having been working on a release plan, which included returning to
his old employment, which was still available to him.  (Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.2.)
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Based on all the new information, defense counsel argued the district court should
suspend Mr. Barry’s sentence, order that he complete the mental health court program or adhere
to other mental health supervision requirements as a term of that release, or alternatively, retain
jurisdiction, as employing either of those alternatives would ensure that Mr. Barry would be
afforded by rehabilitative programming.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.3-13, p.12, Ls.16-23.)  Alternatively, he
requested the district court reduce Mr. Barry’s sentence, so that it would be a unified term of five
years, with only one year fixed, so as to make him parole-eligible.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.8-15.)  These
alternatives, defense counsel argued, would promote the goal of rehabilitation, a goal which was
not being served by the sentence as initially-imposed.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.4-6.)
The district court accepted defense counsel’s offer of proof.  (Tr., p.19, Ls.7-17.)  It also
acknowledged that Mr. Barry was doing well in custody, that he was being cooperative and had
no violations during that period.  (Tr., p.21, Ls.14-19.)  However, it concluded that the new
information presented was not enough to justify changing his sentence.  (Tr., p.21, Ls.20-22.)
The district court explained that it had considered both suspending the sentence and retaining
jurisdiction at the time of the initial sentencing, but given the severity of Mr. Barry’s actions in
this case, it had determined that executing the sentence was the best way to protect society and
deter others.  (Tr., p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.8.)  It also explained it had considered those mitigating
factors in regard to how long a fixed term to impose.  (Tr., p.21, Ls.1-6.)  Mr. Barry filed a notice
of appeal timely from the order denying his Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.93, 95.)
5
ISSUES
1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Barry’s motion for a
continuance to await the results of his mental health court screening.





The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Barry’s Motion For A Continuance To
Await The Results Of His Mental Health Court Screening
The decision of whether to grant a continuance is one submitted to the trial court’s
discretion. State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 627 (1993).  A district court abuses its discretion
when it fails to perceive the issue as one of discretion, fails to act within the outer boundaries of
that discretion or fails to act consistently with applicable legal standards, or fails to reach its
decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).  In this case, the
district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason because its decision prejudiced
Mr. Barry’s due process rights. Cf. State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho at 597, 610 (Ct. App. 1996)
(explaining that, when reviewing the denial of a requested continuance, there usually will not be
an abuse of discretion unless that decision prejudices the defendant’s substantial rights).
Additionally, when, as here, the district court is asked to grant a continuance in regard to Rule 35
proceedings, that discretion must be considered alongside the requirement that the district court
rule on the motion within a reasonable time. Matteson, 123 Idaho at 627.
To that last point, granting the continuance in this case would not have unreasonably
delayed the decision on the motion. See, e.g., State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 353 (1992)
(explaining that there are any number of reasons a decision on a Rule 35 motion might be
reasonably delayed, including the need to hold a hearing, the need to procure medical
examinations, or the existence of other issues “wholly beyond the control of the convicted
defendant”) (internal quotation omitted).  Mr. Barry filed his Rule 35 motion on August 18,
2016, which was timely, but was also on the 119th day of the 120-day period for filing such
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motions.  (R., pp.78, 84.)  The ruling on that motion came at the hearing on December 5, 2016,
which was within four months of Mr. Barry’s filing of the motion.  (Tr., p.3, L.1.)
Nothing about that timing, or extending it a bit further (see Tr., p.4, Ls.3-4), was
unreasonable.  For example, it appears the delay in filing that motion was due to Mr. Barry
seeking  to  find  a  different  attorney  to  represent  him  in  the  Rule  35  process.   (Compare, e.g.,
R., pp.78, 84.)  That fact also indicates that the time between filing the motion and the hearing
was due to the new attorney’s need to get up to speed on the case, and to collect and present the
relevant information in support of the Rule 35 motion while also complying with the time-to-file
requirements.   (See R., p.90 (indicating the new attorney had been able to review the file and
listen to the relevant audio recordings at the time of the initial hearing); Aug., pp.1-3
(Mr. Barry’s MCU Housing Application indicating it was submitted to IDOC officials on
August 18, 2016, and was granted on August 20, 2016, but was not filed with the district court in
support of the Rule 35 motion until November 9, 2016).)  Additionally, the district court
obviously determined a hearing was necessary to resolve the motion.  (See R., p.90 (granting
Mr. Barry’s request for a continuance so that he could initiate the mental health court screening
process).)  Furthermore, the circumstances causing the new delay were caused by factors beyond
Mr. Barry’s control – namely, that the mental health court personnel needed additional time to
adequately review his application to that program.  (Tr., p.3, Ls.21-23.)  Therefore, granting the
continuance so as to get the results from the mental health court screening process would not
have unreasonably delayed the ruling on Mr. Barry’s Rule 35 motion. Compare Chapman, 121
Idaho at 353.
Additionally, the decision to deny the continuance prejudiced Mr. Barry’s substantive
rights.  True, the district court was not required to hold a hearing on Mr. Barry’s Rule 35 motion.
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See, e.g., State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 463 (2002).  However, once it made the discretionary
decision to hold a hearing, that hearing needed to “measure up to the essentials of due process
and fair treatment.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561-62 (1966); cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469
U.S. 387, 401 (1987); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677-78 (1980).  “The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation
omitted).  Therefore, when the district court makes the discretionary decision to hold a hearing
on a Rule 35 motion, the defendant needs to be provided a meaningful opportunity to present
evidence and argument in support of that motion. See also State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203
(2007) (holding that, in order to obtain Rule 35 relief, the defendant must show his sentence is
excessive in light of new or additional information).
In this case, Mr. Barry sought to provide the district court with an alternative sentencing
option which would address some of the district court’s concerns about Mr. Barry’s ability to be
successful  on  probation.   (See, e.g., R., pp.74-75 (expressing concerns about the effects of
Mr. Barry’s substance abuse and mental health issues on his ability to succeed on probation).)
Specifically, the mental health court program would provide substantial monitoring of his
compliance with his medication regimen and with treatment programs.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.13, L.16
- p.14, L.21.)  As such, refusing to grant the continuance to get the results of his application to
that program, the district court deprived Mr. Barry of the meaningful opportunity to present this
new sentencing alternative for the district court’s meaningful consideration.  Ergo, the district
court’s decision to deny Mr. Barry’s request for a continuance prejudiced his due process rights
in the hearing the district court, in its discretion, decided to hold.  Therefore, the decision to deny
the continuance constituted an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Barry’s Rule 35 Motion For Leniency
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203; see
also Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600 (identifying the relevant considerations for reviewing a
discretionary decision).  Additionally, when petitioning for a sentence reduction pursuant to Rule
35, the defendant must show his sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
presented to the sentencing court. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203.
In addressing Rule 35 motions, “[t]he criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence
was reasonable.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).  The protection of society
is the primary objective the court should consider when imposing a sentence, and the other goals
are subservient to that end. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993) (quoting State v.
Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 363 (1956)).  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held that
rehabilitation is the first means by which the district court should attempt to achieve the goal of
protecting society. State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as
stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
As trial counsel pointed out, the sentence as initially-imposed did not address
rehabilitation, as it did not provide Mr. Barry access to treatment programs.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.4-6.)
As a result, Mr. Barry presented new and additional information demonstrating that such
programs were available if the district court imposed a more lenient sentence, and thus, would
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serve the goal of rehabilitation without sacrificing the other goals of sentencing.  In fact, taking
that approach would improve the overall protection society would receive from the sentence.
Fundamentally, it is important to remember that this crime arose during the stresses of a
divorce in a person who does not have a history of criminal conduct.  (See PSI, pp.2-5.)  Thus,
this act is not only out of character for Mr. Barry, but is also the apparent product of a particular
set of circumstances that are unlikely to arise again, as the divorce appears to be concluded.  It is
for these sort of reasons that the Idaho Supreme Court has “recognized that the first offender
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.” State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971)).  Thus, “rehabilitation, particularly of
first offenders, should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the criminal
sanction.” McCoy, 94 Idaho at 240.
To this point, Mr. Barry presented new information with his motion showing that there
were programs potentially available to him which could help him address his mental health
issues, as well as the stresses caused by the divorce, and so, help prevent another incident like
this from occurring again.  Furthermore, Mr. Barry presented new information demonstrating
that he could actually be successful if one of those more lenient sentencing alternatives were
employed.  For example, he had adjusted appropriately to life in prison, did not have disciplinary
issues, and had, therefore, qualified for minimum security placement.  (Aug., pp.3-4.)  “The
[United  States  Supreme Court  has]  emphasized  that  ‘a  defendant's  disposition  to  make  a  well-
behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its
nature relevant to the sentencing determination.’” Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 201-02 (1986)
(quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986)).  Ultimately, what Mr. Barry’s new
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information  shows is  that  there  was  a  viable  path  which  was  potentially  open  to  Mr.  Barry  by
which he could return to being the law-abiding and contributing member of society he had been
for most of his life.
Therefore, the new information Mr. Barry presented in support of his motion, even
without waiting for the results of the mental health screening (see Section I, supra) demonstrates
that a more lenient sentence would better accomplish all the goals of sentencing.  In fact, any of
the alternatives defense counsel proffered would actually address the goal of rehabilitation,
which should have been the district court’s initial consideration at the first sentencing hearing,
but  which  was  the  goal  actually  being  least  served  by  the  sentence  imposed.   As  a  result,  the
district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Barry’s Rule 35 motion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Barry respectfully requests this Court vacate the order denying his Rule 35 motion
and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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